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DEBTS, DISASTERS, AND DELINQUENCIES:
A CASE FOR PLACING A MANDATORY FORCE
MAJEUREPROVISION INTO CONSUMER CREDIT
AGREEMENTS
NORMAN I. SILBER
ABSTRACT

This article addresses inequities in the apportionment of losses that
arise when traditional rules of consumer finance are applied to enforce
payment obligations that accrue during and after catastrophes. Disasters
lead inevitably to job losses, property destruction, inhibited access to
homes and workplaces, and problems with debt repayment. In the wake of
such devastation, fees and interest charges mount, and payment defaults
increase. The author argues that hardships and social distress can be
mitigated, and losses more equitably allocated, by mandating the inclusion
of a force majeure provision in consumer agreements.
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I.
INTRODUCTION: THE IMPACT OF DISASTERS

If San Francisco, or Miami, or Manhattan-or any densely populated
area-were rendered uninhabitable by an earthquake, a flood, or some
awful weapon, how would the law of consumer finance affect recovery?
The prospect that a serious catastrophe might occur is horrifying, but it is
within the realm of possibility. For decades, geologists and disaster
planners have been seriously concerned about a major earthquake hitting
the West Coast.' Crippling floods and hurricanes have affected the
Atlantic and Gulf Coasts with increasing severity 2 and frequency.3 Nor can
the possibility of an assault on an American city using biological, chemical,
or radioactive means be dismissed lightly.' When a catastrophic event
comes to pass, homes and apartments might not be habitable for months or
even years. Businesses would close and many of them would not reopen.
The impact on most aspects of everyday life would be traumatic.
An important dimension of such a calamity would be its impact on
commercial life, and particularly on the welfare of consumers. A
companion article explored the pervasive consumer problems and debt
repayment difficulties that occurred along the Gulf Coast, and in New
Orleans particularly, after Hurricane Katrina.' Katrina caused a state of
emergency that formally lasted approximately three months but required a
recovery effort that continues up to the present time, delayed by a poor
1. See Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., FEMA:
Earthquake Risk by State and Territory, http://www.fema.gov/hazard/ earthquake/risk.shtm
(last visited Dec. 2, 2010) (listing several West Coast states as having a "very high risk" of
earthquakes).
2. Kerry Emanuel, IncreasingDestructiveness of Tropical Cyclones Over the Past 30
at
available
(2005),
686
686,
NATURE
436
Years,
ftp://texmex.mit.edu/pub/emanuel/PAPERS/NATUREO3906.pdf.
3. See Lisa Gardiner, Are Hurricanes Becoming Stronger and More Frequent? (Sept.
14, 2005), http://www.windows2universe.org/earth/climate/hurricane_ climate.html (noting
that frequency of hurricanes varies based on natural twenty- to forty-year cycle and that
scientists predict that we will experience more frequent hurricanes than normal through
2015).
4. See Elizabeth Eraker, Cleanup After a Radiological Attack: US. Prepares
Guidance,NONPROLIFERATION REV., Nov. 2004, at 167 (outlining national preparations for
dirty bombs and other potentially catastrophic terrorist attacks).
5. Norman I. Silber, Thriving on Adversity: CorporateTreatmentand Mistreatmentof
Consumers in the Wake of Humicane Katrina, 22 Lov. CONSUMER L. REV. 139 (2009)
[hereinafter Silber, Thriving on Adversityj.
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economy and a disastrous oil spill.6
This article explores the contracts and debt obligations of those who
would be affected in another disaster of similar or even greater magnitude
and duration and suggests a reform that could ameliorate foreseeable
consumer finance difficulties in a manner consistent with contemporary
approaches to consumer protection. Part II considers ways in which many
businesses protect themselves against catastrophic risks. Part III explains
the barriers to risk insulation that consumers face because of creditordrafted financial instruments. Part IV analyzes deficiencies in solutions
that are market-based or oriented toward government relief payments.
Part V offers a proposal to reapportion the burdens associated with the
accumulation of consumer debt during catastrophes through a mandated
force majeure provision.
II.
PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION OF RISK BY BUSINESS DEBTORS

Both natural and man-made disasters can cause significant economic
fallout. The value of commercial real estate and government, residential,
and personal property would all diminish in a major catastrophe. Financial
losses would result from the destruction of tangible and intangible assets,
from lost patronage, and particularly from the destruction of business
properties, including repair costs and lost productivity. Insurers, banks,
and other financial institutions would watch their secured loans decline in
value as the financial position of their business debtors worsened and the
collateral that supported their lending dropped in value. They would also
watch their unsecured business debts lose value as the revenue streams
flowing from borrowers become disrupted, causing borrowers to miss
payment deadlines and eventually to default.'
In this setting, commercial creditors are motivated to enforce their
contractual rights as vigorously as possible against commercial debtors-to
recover from them the full value of all payments due plus interest accrued
6. See, e.g., Amy Liu & Nigel Holmes, The State of New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
28, 2010, at WK10 ( "Two years [after Katrina], the Great Recession arrived, drying up

private capital for redevelopment and blunting the job gains that had been expected from
rebuilding. Then, in April [2010], the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded, wreaking havoc
on the region's already battered economy and environment.").

7. Major loans to businesses are generally secured-i.e., they are conditioned on the
lender's receipt of collateral, or guarantees worth more than the indebtedness. In the event
of a default on the law, the creditor has the right to take ownership of the collateral. To the
extent that collateral diminishes in value because of a catastrophe, a secured creditor may
no longer be able to recover the value of the loan should the borrower default. Consumer
credit debt is generally either unsecured, like most credit card debt, or secured by the very
consumer goods that are likely to deteriorate or disappear in a catastrophe. See generally
BARKLEY CLARK & BARBARA CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACrIONS UNDER THE

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (rev. ed. 1999) (outlining law of financial transactions).
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during any delay-plus late fees, attorneys' collection fees, and other
charges. They will issue demands for payment to all their potentially
accountable commercial debtors who entered into business debt
agreements before the disaster. Commercial creditors are also likely to file
claims against insolvent commercial parties in bankruptcy proceedings.
Commercial debtors, however, can and do protect themselves against
the risk of disasters in a number of ways, including through the purchase of
insurance against liability for breaches of their own payment obligations
that result from events beyond their control. These policies indemnify
them against losses arising from their inability to continue the normal
operations and functions of a business and provide sums which allow them
to make installment payments on their own debt instruments.' One survey
found that about a quarter of American businesses carry conventional
"business interruption" insurance protection, attached to commercial
property insurance policies.' At least fifteen major insurance companies
offer "Property Terrorism Insurance" coverage designed to protect major
corporations against all types of terrorist events.10
Commercial debtors and tenants are able to spread the risk that a
catastrophe will prevent repayment of a debt through the insertion of
mutually protective clauses and waivers of subrogation in loan and lease
agreements." For instance, an increasing number of business loan and
8. See RICK L. HAMMOND, UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF BUSINESS INTERRUPTION
.html ("Business
http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Jun/l/127909
(1999),
interruption insurance is designed to protect the prospective earnings of the insured
business. It is also designed to do for the insured, in the event of a loss, what the business
would have done for itself if an interruption in the operation of the business had not
occurred."). See also DANIEL T. TORPEY, DANIEL G. LENTZ & DAVID A. BARRETT, THE
BUSINESS INTERRUPTION BOOK: COVERAGE, CLAIMS, AND RECOVERY 21-41 (2004)
(discussing common elements of coverage in standard business insurance policies).
INSURANCE

9. Steven Lobel, Business InterruptionInsurance Can ProtectProspective Earnings,
http://www.amer-tech.com/articlesl2001,
3,
Dec.
REV.,
Bus.
90/BusinesslnterruptionInsuranceCanProtectProspective Earnings.
10. See MARSH, MERCER, KROLL, MARKETWATCH: TERRORISM INSURANCE 2009: THE
at
available
(2009),
MARKET
TERRORISM
STANDALONE
http://global.marsh.com/documents/Marketwatch StandaloneTerrorismMarketQl_2009
.pdf (indicating that a theoretical maximum of approximately three billion dollars in such
insurance is available as of 2009). See also Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 103,
Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 28 U.S.C.)
(prohibiting exclusion of terrorism risks in commercial property and casualty policies, and
authorizing program under which government shares risk of loss from future terrorist acts).
See generally AIG, Property Terrorism, http://www.aig.com/Comm-Property-Terrorismand-Sabotage_262_ 151870.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2010) (marketing property insurance
for damages resulting from acts of terrorism).
11. Commercial lessors regularly include mutually protective clauses, mutual waivers
of subrogation (by which the parties renounce claims against each other for insured or
insurable damage to the property of the party who waives), and clauses requiring landlords
to carry insurance against floods, earthquakes, and other catastrophes. See Sidney G. Saltz,
Allocation of Insurable Risks in CommercialLeases, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 479,
481 (2002) (noting that commercial leases customarily include numerous provisions seeking
ALBANY
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lease agreements contain mutual "force majeure" clauses, which suspend a
commercial debtor's payment obligations when "Acts of God" interfere
with performance and reduce or entirely excuse debtors' and creditors'
responsibilities during a catastrophic event, and for a period thereafter.12
to allocate, as between the parties, risks of injury to persons or damage to property and
require insurance to cover these risks). Recommended standard terms place the burden of
insurance against catastrophes on lessors. Thus a sample lease term regarding insurance
reads:
Landlord's Insurance. Landlord shall procure and maintain policies of
insurance insuring:

(b) The improvements at any time situated upon the Real Estate against
loss or damage by fire, lightning, wind storm, hail storm, aircraft, vehicles,
smoke, explosion, riot or civil commotion as provided by the Standard
Fire and Extended Coverage Policy and all other risks of direct physical
loss as insured against under Special Form ("all risk" coverage). The
insurance coverage shall be for not less than ninety percent (90%) of the
full replacement cost of such improvements with agreed amount
endorsement. Landlord shall be named as the insured and all proceeds of
insurance shall be payable to Landlord. Said insurance shall contain an
endorsement waiving the insurer's right of subrogation against any
Tenant Protected Party, provided that such waiver of the right of
subrogation shall not be operative in any case where the effect thereof is
to invalidate such insurance coverage or increase the cost thereof.
Landlord shall promptly give Tenant written notice thereof and Tenant
shall have the right, within thirty (30) days following such written notice,
to pay any increased cost, thereby keeping such waiver in full force and
effect.
(c) Landlord's business income, protecting Landlord from loss of rents
and other charges during the period while the Leased Premises are
untenantable due to fire or other casualty (for the period reasonably
determined by Landlord).
(d) Flood or earthquake insurance whenever, in the reasonable judgment
of Landlord, such protection is necessary and it is available at
commercially reasonable cost.
Id. at 502. In other areas of commercial debtor-creditor relations common forms also
include such terms. See, e.g., Internet Legal Research Group, New York Commercial
Lease Agreement, http://www.ilrg.com/forms/lease-comm/us/ny (last visited Dec. 2, 2010)
(providing a standard commercial lease form that includes clause relieving tenant from
payment of rent and other charges during any portion of term that leased premises cannot
be used for tenant's purposes or are unfit for occupancy). Because they presume relatively
level bargaining power and at least the availability of representation, commercial leases
often provide an option to excuse performance in the event that eitherparty experiences an
unforeseeable calamity.
12. Characteristic force majeure clauses in a commercial agreement contain such
language as:
Neither party shall be liable in damages or have the right to terminate
this agreement for any delay or default in performing hereunder if such
delay or default is caused by conditions beyond its control including but
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And when all else fails, bankruptcy laws permit for-profit corporations
the alternative of modifying, extending, and discharging unsecured and
under-secured debts through a corporate liquidation or reorganization.13
Bankruptcy is generally unfortunate for shareholders, managers, and
employees, but it is effective for limiting creditor recoveries.
III.
CONSUMER VULNERABILITY TO THE EXTERNALIZATION
OF CREDITOR RISK

Consumer debtors are situated quite differently from business debtors.
They confront a different insurance market, and they have different
incentives to purchase policies. As an initial matter of contractual risk
allocation, consumers have scant ability to reshape standard forms of legal
agreement. And, as a matter of judicial recourse, they confront a litigation
climate in which courts uphold traditional views of contracting by
enforcing standard form provisions that reject consumer defenses based on
excuse.
While business debtors can readily insure against business operation
losses from catastrophic risk, it is difficult for consumers to protect against
their own loss of income or necessary delays in debt repayment. Except
not limited to acts of God, government restrictions (including the denial
or cancellation of any export of other necessary license), wars,
insurrections and/or any other cause beyond the reasonable control of the
party whose performance is affected (including mechanical, electronic, or
communications failure).
Or:
Neither party shall be liable for any failure or delay in performance
under this Agreement ([other than for][including a] delay in the
payment of money due and payable hereunder) to the extent said
failures or delays are proximately caused (I) by causes beyond that
party's reasonable control and occurring without its fault or negligence,
including, without limitation, failure of suppliers, subcontractors, and
carriers, or party to substantially meet its performance obligations under
this Agreement, provided that, as a condition to the claim of no liability,
the party experiencing the difficulty shall give the other prompt written
notice, with full details following the occurrence of the cause relied
upon. Dates by which performance obligations are scheduled to be met
will be extended for a period of time equal to the time lost due to any
delay so caused.
AllBusiness.com, What is a Force Majeure Clause?, http://www.allbusiness.com/
legal/contracts-agreements/541-1.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2010). The force majeureclauses
in commercial agreements typically apply to natural disasters, riots, and wars, as well as
third party performance failures outside the contracting parties' control. See, e.g., Licensing
Digital Information, Force Majeure, http://www.library.yale.edu/~llicense/forcecls.shtml
(last visited Dec. 2, 2010) (listing sample force majeure clauses in commercial contracts).
13. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, FinancialCharacteristics of
Businesses in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 499, 558 (1999) (noting that some
businesses reported that hurricanes pushed them into bankruptcy).
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for some umbrella policies or those with special riders, homeowners'
insurance policies and automobile insurance policies protect against
property destruction but do not provide credit insurance to cover
employment interruption.14 Several other types of disaster risk-such as
moving of earth, floods, war and insurrection, and terrorism-are
frequently excluded from homeowners' policies."
Consumer credit insurance, debt cancellation agreements, and creditrelated insurance products-which could provide some relief to consumers
unable to meet their obligations due to illness, unemployment, disability or
death-have proven inadequate to these tasks. 16 insurance to cover a
mortgage or credit card debt against loss of life, sickness, or certain types
of involuntary unemployment, is always sold for a specific loan, and not
always for the full length of the loan or the full loan amount. 7
Homeowners Insurance,
14. See, e.g., Texas Department of Insurance,
http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/pubs/consumer/cb025.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2010) (noting that
most homeowners' insurance covers "damage or destruction to your house and any
unattached structures and buildings, such as fences, detached garages, and storage sheds ...
theft, damage, or destruction of the contents of your house, including furniture, clothing,
and appliances . . . financial loss if you are sued and found legally responsible for someone
else's injury or property damage ... medical bills for people hurt on your property ... [and]
additional living expenses (temporary housing, food, and other essential expenses) if you
must temporarily move while repairs are made").
15. See, e.g., id. (noting that most Texas polices do not cover flooding and
earthquakes, among other things).
16. Credit insurance is extremely profitable for creditors because creditors are
compensated by the insurers whose credit insurance products they sell, are the primary
beneficiaries of the policies they sell, and charge interest on the insurance premiums which
are due from their borrowers. ELIZABETH RENUART, KATHLEEN E. KEEST, CAROLYN L.
CARTER, ALYS I. COHEN & CHI CHI Wu, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE COST OF
CREDIT: REGULATION, PREEMPTION, AND INDUSTRY ABUSES § 8.2.2 (3d ed. 2005)
[hereinafter THE COST OF CREDIT]. By contrast, credit insurance offers few benefits to

consumers. See id.at § 8.1 (describing how insufficient regulation and market competition
have led to systemic failures in credit insurance market, leading to "annual overcharges of
$2.5 billion" and creation of market in which "consumers spend as much as $6 billion per
year on credit insurance, often with little understanding of what they have bought.");
ELIZABETH RENUART, KATHLEEN KEEST, CAROLYN L. CARTER, CHI CHI Wu, ALYS 1.
COHEN, DIANE THOMPSON & JOHNATHAN SHELDON, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TRUTH
IN LENDING § 3.9.4.1 (6th ed. 2007) (noting that credit insurance is more expensive than
comparable coverage sold outside of credit context and "that the borrower's chance of
collecting on a policy may be smaller than one would expect"). But see Consumer Credit
Consumer Information: What is Credit Insurance?,
Insurance
Association,
http://www.cciaonline.com/consumers.nsfldefault.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2010) (providing
favorable description of products from the perspective of credit insurance industry
association).
17. Eg., New York State Insurance Department, Life Insurance - Top Ten Questions:
Credit Insurance, http://www.ins.state.ny.us/que toplO/que_1ife -cre.htm (last visited Dec. 2,
2010). To illustrate how credit life insurance works, the Oregon Insurance Division offers
the following example:
A 30-year-old woman in good health is taking out a $5,000, five-year loan.
She can buy credit life insurance for the five-year life of the loan, paying a
single premium of $112.50, to be added to her total loan amount. If she
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Furthermore, credit card insurance policies can include unexpected
exclusions and proof requirements." Major actors in the private market
for consumer credit insurance have historically engaged in predatory and
unscrupulous practices and have charged excessive rates,19 leading many
financial advisers to discourage its use.20
Even if the credit insurance market operated with greater
transparency and fairness, credit insurance probably would appear worth
purchasing only for a subset of persons with means, good credit, and a high
fear of future misfortune. For poorer consumers, the cost of insuring
against a distant, low probability risk may appear to be an indulgence
compared to present need for consumption.2 1
dies, the insurance will cover only the outstanding balance of the loan.
Life insurance, however, pays the entire amount of the policy value. If
she already has an individual term life insurance policy for $50,000 and
increases it by $5,000, the additional cost would total less than $15 for the
five-year loan period. If she buys a new term life insurance policy, the
cost will be about $500 for five years of coverage.
Oregon Insurance Division, Wise Choices - Oregon Credit Insurance,
http://insurance.oregon.gov/consumer/credit-insurance/wccred.html (last visited Dec. 2,
2010).
18. See, e.g., Marshall v. Citicorp Mortgage, 601 So. 2d 669, 671-72 (La. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that ten-year decreasing term credit life insurance policy on fifteen-year loan, in
which contract failed to disclose that "insurance proceeds . . . would drop to 'zero' in 10
years" regardless of the balance of the debt at that time, was unconscionable and violated
Unfair Trade Practices law); Tomaszewski v. McKeon Ford, Inc., 573 A.2d 501 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1990) (describing instance in which car dealer selling credit life insurance
neglected to tell buyer that credit life insurance plan excluded her spouse); Kermit Card v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 669 N.Y.S.2d 117 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1996) (holding that defendants'
deceptive solicitation of credit card did not disclose standards for unemployment claim or
third party status of solicitor).
19. THE COST OF CREDIT, supra note 16, at § 8.5.1 (noting that credit insurance sales
can be a pretext for usury and that "overpricing [and] a variety of abusive marketing
practices . . . are all too common in connection with credit and ancillary non-credit

insurance sales"). See alsoJulia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgagingthe American Dream,
74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 1303-5 (2006) (describing nine hundred million dollar credit
insurance fraud perpetrated by Citigroup and others); Christopher Peterson, Federalism
and PredatoryLending, Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REv. 1, 22
(2005) (noting that "predatory lenders tend to use the product as an opportunity to gouge
unsuspecting consumers by packing unreasonable amounts of insurance in their loans").
20. Eg. THE COST OF CREDIT, supra note 16, at § 8.1 (noting that "for many years
advisors outside the credit industry have recommended that most consumers do not
purchase" credit insurance). See also, e.g., Gene Marsh, A Practitioner'sGuide to the New
Alabama Mini-Code, 48 ALA. L. REV. 957, 989 (1997) (stating that consumer credit
insurance "is generally a bad bargain by any measure"); Peterson, supra note 19, at 22
(noting that "consumer investments in credit insurance tend to have poor value). But see
Maurice L. Shevin, Pro Consumer Finance, 58 ALA. LAW. 230, 233 (1997) (arguing that
"credit insurance is a valuable product to assist those who borrow with the intent to repay
their debts, but are set back by disability, unemployment and even death. . . . The premium
on such insurances is not pure profit. There is a real risk which is insured, and insurance
claims are paid each and every day on behalf of customers who have covered losses.").
21. The extent to which debtors try to protect themselves in the present by putting
away savings against disruptive "shocks" that might occur in the future, and their
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Furthermore, in distinction from business debtors, it is exceptional for
consumers to negotiate out of catastrophic risk by contracting in advance
through express agreement. The standard language contained in consumer
debt agreements does not include any provision to relieve consumers of
their payment obligations in the wake of a disaster.22 Consumers are
almost always incapable of inserting nonstandard provisions or
exculpatory, self-protective language into standard installment sales and
lease agreements. They have little ability to insist upon sharing, reducing,
or shedding their payment obligations when acts beyond their control
make debt repayment impossible.
Upon default, courts will enforce payment terms in standard
agreements because American contract law leaves little ground for
consumers to challenge such charges. Notwithstanding a lack of mutuality
in the risk allocation, contract terms defining strict default rules are
presumptively enforceable. 24 The presumption is justified based on the
motivations, is a contested matter in the law and economics literature. See, e.g., M. Keith
Chen & Alan Schwartz, Intertemporal Choice and Legal Constraints, 53 J.L. & ECON.
(forthcoming 2010) (on file with author) (using game theory to demonstrate that consumer
borrowing regulations and current savings instruments are inadequate to optimize
protection against income shocks). Whether non-savers (non-insurers) have adequate
information and cognitive ability to calculate the risk of misfortunes such as their own
unemployment or ill health, or even communal catastrophes, is doubtful. Oren Bar-Gill,
The BehavioralEconomics of Consumer Contracts,92 MINN. L. REv. 749, 754-65 (2008)
[hereinafter Bar-Gill, Behavioral Economics] (presenting evidence of persistence of
consumer mistakes). See also infra Part IV. But see Richard Epstein, Symposium: Homo
Economicus,Homo Myopicus, and the Law and Economics of Consumer Choice: Human
Errors and Market Corrections,73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 111-13 (2006) (acknowledging
existence of cognitive biases but arguing that these do not impair rational decisionmaking if
rational decisionmaking is defined as consciously seeking to make oneself better off).
22. See, e.g., infra notes 36, 44, and 45 for examples of standard form provisions for
payment contained in VISA card and other agreements.
23. Silber, Thriving on Adversity, supra note 5, at 140 (describing inequities in
consumer-creditor bargaining power).
24. See Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and
Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REv 583, 594-96 (1990) (defining consumer
form contracts and discussing their presumptive enforceability). See also, e.g., McFarland v.
Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 293 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. App. 2009) (holding that, based on
consumer's usage of credit card and language in agreement, reasonable inference may be
drawn that consumer impliedly agreed to pay fixed amount equal to purchases and cash
advances he made, plus interest); Winchek v. Amer. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 232
S.W.3d 197, 204 (Tex. App. 2007) (holding that user of a credit card agrees to be
responsible for interest and late fees).
When debts are purchased by aggregators, furthermore, courts will often convert
accumulated late fees and charges into a new principal amount in the hands of the debt
purchasers. See Lorraine Nordland, Presentation at the Protecting Consumers in Debt
Collection Litigation and Arbitration: A Roundtable Discussion (Sept. 29-30, 2009),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/ debtcollectroundtable2/091119outline.pdf ("[Plurchaseddebt default matters have run into very few impediments in the district courts, and the debt
purchasers have come to see it as a matter of right that they be allowed to prevail in a
default situation, even though they have no supporting evidence of any contractual
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formal consent given by debtors and by the economic value standard forms
are said to provide to consumers in the form of cost savings from
transactional efficiency and lower prices.25
Governing Restatement and Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)
provisions reflect this classical economic perspective about form contracts.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts contains a test for the
enforceability of a term in a standard agreement which directs that a term
is not an enforceable part of the contract "where the other party has
reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if
he knew that the writing contained a particular term."26 The U.C.C. does
not have a provision that directly addresses the enforceability of adhesive
and unbargained-for terms that are not unconscionable. While the
unconditional nature of payment terms might appear to be pernicious from
a subsequently affected consumer's point of view, it is considered an
effective, legitimate method for risk allocation in our competitive,
efficiency-driven market economy.27
The judicial response to the enforcement of debtor obligations after
agreement. Moreover, there seems to be a universal misunderstanding by the assignee
debt-purchasers that the charge-off amount is THEIR balance, and therefore all they have
to do is prove that this was the balance at the time they bought the debt.").
25. The supposition is that these prices are lower than consumers might have to pay if
they did not assume responsibility for interest and installment payments that accrue during
events beyond their control, or if they had to negotiate these terms individually. See
Meyerson, supra note 24, at 587-88 (noting that "'[s]o-called default terms' or 'gap fillers'
reduce the complexity and cost of contract negotiation" and that these terms are presumed
to be economically efficient).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981) ("Where the other party
has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that
the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.").
27. Commentators agree that standard form contracts have social utility. They
facilitate mass marketing of goods and services by creating one-size-fits-all contracts, the
cost of which can be amortized over numerous transactions. They also permit sellers to
monitor a substantial sales force more readily by avoiding variations in contract terms.
Additionally, standard form contracts standardize terms in ways that facilitate
interpretation both by parties to the contract and by third-party interpreters. This
minimizes transactions costs, resulting in net benefits to consumers, reflected in the lower
price of mass-marketed goods. Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 743, 747 (2002) (arguing that standard form contracts are generally enforceable and
efficient because sellers "pass along savings [from lower bargaining costs, reduced contract
litigation, and standardized risks] to consumers in the form of lower prices. Moreover,
sellers can best determine the particular set of terms that 'fits' the practical problems and
needs that arise . . . in carrying out the transactions, and therefore, produce the most

efficient allocation of risks for both parties." (internal citations and quotations omitted));
Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contractsas an Agency Problem, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 679, 68081 (2004). This economic perspective is shared by contracts scholars and courts. See, e.g.,
David Horton, Unconscionabilityinthe Law of Trusts,84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1675, 1690
(2009) (using law and economics framework to argue that sellers in all circumstances will
offer terms in standard form contracts that increase buyers' welfare and, as such, that such
contracts are efficient and should be enforced by courts "as written, no matter how 'unfair'

[they] seem[ ... J").
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Hurricane Katrina was grounded in traditional approaches.' Some
creditors warned storm victims immediately after the hurricane that,
although they might defer payments during the emergency, interest
charges attributable to the postponements would certainly be collected.29
Nothing in the reported case law suggests that the catastrophe led courts to
reduce the interest amount creditors could claim when obtaining a
judgment. Classical assumptions about the enforcement of standard form
consumer contracts held firm, despite growing doubts about the validity of
classical assumptions underpinning the enforcement of terms in, inter alia,
consumer contracts.30
Put another way, the occasion of a catastrophic event will increase the
number of injured persons and the size of each debt, but it does not
generally lead courts to doubt the ex ante reasonableness- and therefore
the enforceability-of the terms of the payment obligation. Whether it is a
hurricane, whose incidence might be factored by a debtor at the time of
contracting and might lead the debtor to wish for a change in the
boilerplate term if it were possible, or the proverbial meteor from Outer
Space, whose potential incidence would never enter a debtor's calculation
of default risk, the problem for the unfortunate consumer is similar. In
both cases, multitudes have taken upon themselves responsibility for
failure to pay for any reason, presumably for a better price than they
otherwise would pay. This reinforces the position that the terms are
enforceable under the Restatement standard. Absent unusual facts (did
the meteor also destroy all records of the transaction, perhaps?), it
disqualifies any particular debtor for an adjustment of terms under a
classical treatment of the standards for excusing performance.
28. See, e.g., In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 208-21 (5th Cir. 2007)
(reversing lower court decision finding that contract term "flood" is ambiguous and holding
that flood exclusion in insurance contract barred recovery for damages caused by flooding
from breached levees during Hurricane Katrina); Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
507 F.3d 346, 352-53 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that exclusion in insurance contract that
prevented recover for water damage, "include[ing] damages caused by, among other things,
flood, waves, tidal water, and overflow of a body of water, 'all whether driven by wind or
not,"' prevented recovery for damage by storm surge during Hurricane Katrina); A.
Brooke Overby, Mortgage ForeclosureIn Post-KatrinaNew Orleans,48 B.C. L. REv. 851,
867 (2008) (noting that, while Mississippi instituted moratorium on foreclosures following
Hurricane Katrina, "in Louisiana creditors retained all rights that they had before the
storm and .

.

. in the case of default could easily and quickly seek foreclosure on the

debtor's property either through ordinary or executory proceedings").
29. See Silber, Thriving on Adversity, supra note 5, at 147, 170 (noting that creditors
did not forgive outstanding interest on debts and that "[i]n most of the cases studied ...
even if late charges were waived and payment obligations were suspended . . . interest

charges on pre-existing balances nevertheless continued to accrue").
30. See, e.g., discussion infra Part IV(A).
31. Section 2-302, the U.C.C.'s unconscionability provision, allows a court to provide
relief if the court finds the term to have been "unconscionable at the time it was made."
U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2001). Courts will not hold credit card agreements unconscionable
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In the absence of greater protection, consumers will remain uniquely
vulnerable to the economic impacts of disasters. In future catastrophes,
creditors will argue that their contractual rights permit them to continue to
demand adherence to the strict legal terms of their obligations.32 They will
invoke payment terms permitting them to continue to collect base service
fees, even though the actual use of those services is impossible.3 3 They will
invoke the payment schedules and calculation rules contained in credit
cardholder and sales agreements that permit them to charge compound
interest on pre-catastrophe balances and to continue to charge interest
during extended periods of the catastrophe itself.34 Consumers and their
advocates will find that penalty and late fee provisions, detailed security
because of unequal bargaining power. See, e.g., Albank, FSB v. Foland, 676 N.Y.S.2d 461,
462-63 (N.Y. City. Ct. 1998). Numerous courts have held that contracts remain enforceable
even when unforeseen weather-related events prevent one party from benefiting from the
original contract. See Louis Dreyfus Corp. v. Brown, 709 F.2d 898, 899 n.2 (5th Cir. 1983)
(noting that defendant conceded that bad weather did not excuse failure of commercial
party to perform contract, citing Ralston Pwrina Co. v. Rooker, 346 So. 2d 901 (Miss.
1977)); Meek v. Cunha, 96 P. 107, 107 (Cal. Ct. App. 1908) (holding that lessee unable to
grow crops due to massive flooding was not entitled to apportionment of rent).
Impracticability may also offer consumers a defense to performance. Section 261 of
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts permits the discharge of the obligation to perform
where, "after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his
fault by the occurrence of an event the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made . . . unless the language or circumstances indicate the

contrary." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981). However, it is harder to
demonstrate the impracticality of performance by money payments (which are fungible and
easy to transfer), as compared to performance by delivery of goods (which are often
perishable, fragile, and subject to the vicissitudes of transportation). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 263 (stating that "[i]f the existence of a specific thing is
necessary for the performance of a duty, its .

.

. destruction .

.

. as makes performance

impracticable is an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made," thus discharging the debtor's responsibility). See generally Sheldon
W. Halpern, Application of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability: Searching for
"The Wisdom of Solomon, " 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1123, 1131-1154 (1987) (tracing the
doctrine's emphasis on physical difficulty of performance). Consumers thus may have
difficulty resorting to this provision. At the same time, the parties "may, by appropriate
language, agree to perform in spite of impracticability that would otherwise justify . . .
nonperformance" and "factors such as the practical difficulty of reaching agreement on the
myriad of conceivable terms of a complex agreement may excuse a failure to deal with
improbable contingencies." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261, cmt. c. U.C.C.
Section 2-615(a) similarly excuses the seller for the failure to deliver goods when the
delivery is made "impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of
which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made," U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (2001),
but does not excuse non-performance "when the contingency in question is sufficiently
foreshadowed at the time of contracting," id.at cmt. 8.
32. See generallySilber, Thriving on Adversity, supra note 5 (explaining imbalance in
creditor-consumer relations in aftermath of Hurricane Katrina).
33. See id at 140 (explaining with documentation that consumers were bound to their
payment obligations for goods, services, and property even when inaccessible or unusable
in the aftermath of Katrina disaster).
34. Id.
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provisions, comprehensive definitions of "default," and specific terms for
payment are fairly impregnable." Such agreements rarely allow debtors to
In their
postpone payments, much less forgive interest or principal.
defense, consumers will try to argue that standard form consumer
contracts, either by implication or via the invocation of equitable
doctrines, should compel creditors either to excuse performance or to
reform contracts in light of unforeseen circumstances. Such arguments will
require costly litigation-and, if precedent is observed, will generally be
unsuccessful.
Victims of future disasters will find, as did the majority of victims of
Katrina, that lenders are permitted to invoke default clauses and payment
obligations contained in open-end38 and closed-end 3 9 credit agreements
and can insist on timely payments of principal and interest -regardless of
35. Id.
36. A representative credit agreement with VISA reads:
Default. You will be in default if you fail to make any Minimum
Payment when due. You will also be in default if (a) your ability to repay
us is materially reduced by a change in your employment, an increase in
your obligations, bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings involving you,
your death or your failure to abide by this Agreement, (b) you break any
promise you have made to us under this Agreement or any other
agreement you have with us, (c) any statement you have made in this
agreement, in connection with this Agreement, or in connection with any
other agreement you have with us is not true, or (d) we should otherwise
feel insecure in receiving payment of the Account balance for whatever
reason. If you are in default, we have the right to demand immediate
payment of your full Account Balance at once without notice to you. In
the event of a default, you agree to pay all costs of collecting the amount
you owe under this agreement including, if the unpaid balance under this
plan is greater than Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) at the time of
collection, reasonable attorney's fees if the debt is referred for collection
to any attorney who is not our employee and if suit be filed, court costs.
Agreement,
of
Credit
Line
and
Application
Card
Credit
Visa,
http://www.usouthal.edulusafedcu/creditcardapplication.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2010).
37. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. My research has not revealed any case
discussion of a debtor's challenge to the application of interest charges during the period
following a natural disaster.
38. The Federal Reserve's Truth in Lending Regulations define open-end credit as:
consumer credit extended by a creditor under a plan in which: (i) The
creditor reasonably contemplates repeated transactions; (ii) The creditor
may impose a finance charge from time to time on an outstanding unpaid
balance; and (iii) The amount of credit that may be extended to the
consumer during the term of the plan (up to any limit set by the creditor)
is generally made available to the extent that any outstanding balance is
repaid.
12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(20) (2009). Credit cards, among other revolving lines of credit, are
open-end. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.5 (2009).
39. Promissory notes, among other fixed term obligations, are closed end. See 12
C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(10) (2009) (defining closed-end credit as "consumer credit other than
open-end credit").
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the existence of an emergency or the uninhabitability of residences and
places of employment.' Lenders will, if necessary, invoke merger and
parol evidence doctrines to exclude any evidence supporting their
willingness to share responsibility for interest or principal payments that
come due while a state of emergency persists. Acceleration clauses41 will
be invoked to demand payment in full of entire loan obligations in the
event a single condition of default is established.42
Mortgagees (banks and other financial institutions) can insist on the
right to collect principal and interest on their home mortgage payments in
accordance with mortgage agreements. Banks and secured credit card
lenders will likely invoke the right to take possession of collateral or
insurance proceeds offered in support of home equity loan agreements.43
Finance companies can foreclose on valuable collateral, including bank
40. See Silber, Thriving on Adversity, supra note 5, at 182 (describing how, postKatrina, "[companies] took advantage of the standard form contractual provisions in their
customer agreements which consumers did not actually bargain for in the first place . . . to
shift losses from their shareholders and management onto their customer base").
41. See U.C.C. § 1-309 (2001) (describing contract terms which provide that "one party
or that party's successor in interest may accelerate payment or performance or require
collateral or additional collateral 'at will' or when the party 'deems itself insecure"').
42. A characteristic acceleration clause reads: "In the event of default in the payment
of any of the said installments or said interest when due as herein provided, time being of
the essence hereof, the holder of this note may, without notice or demand, declare the
entire principal sum then unpaid immediately due and payable." Quazell.com, Promissory
Note - Installment - With Acceleration Clause, http://www.quazell.com/BusinessLetters
/trpromnot3.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2010). See, e.g,. Supreme Realty, Inc. v. Wurzel, 636
P.2d 1327, 1329 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (finding promissory note acceleration clause
premised upon default in payment valid and enforceable); Smith v. Certified Realty Corp.,
585 P.2d 293, 294 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978) (finding promissory note acceleration clause
premised upon default in payment valid and enforceable); Dumas v. Helm, 166 N.W.2d 306,
308 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968) (finding acceleration clause of land contract valid and
enforceable since "acceleration clauses, even when harsh, are enforceable").
43. The security language in a representative home equity loan agreement and
promissory note provides:
To secure payment of all amounts owed on your home equity loan, you
must give us security interest in the real property described in the
Multiple Indebtedness Mortgage that you sign at the time of the loan
settlement. You also must assign us (a) any rents or profits form the
property, (b) any proceeds of the insurance you must obtain.. . . and (c)
any proceeds of any condemnation award, or sale in lieu of
condemnation, for such property. You also pledge and grant to us a
security interest in, and a right of set-off against, all monies and other
property of yours that is on deposit with us or under our control. We have
the right, but are not required to take such action as is necessary to
protect the security interest described in this paragraph. Any amounts we
may pay m exercising our right to protect our security interests must be
paid by you on demand, and will bear interest at the Annual Percentage
Rate than applicable to your account until paid.
Home Equity Line of Credit Loan Agreement and Promissory Note,
http://ig.libertyonline.net/ImageGallery/Custom/cu0439/PDFs/heloc_1oanagreement.pdf
(last visited Dec. 2, 2010).
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deposit accounts and realizable and accessible personal property."
Landlords likewise enjoy protections included in rental apartment
lease agreements. If tenants assert the putative obligations of landlords to
adjust debt obligations during a state of emergency due to the impossibility
or impracticality of living in a dwelling,4 5 landlords can usually insist on
their right to collect principal and interest on both rents due and back rent,
notwithstanding the nonhabitability of their rental properties. They
generally will be successful."
Automobile finance lenders can assert their right to collect loan
payments, together with all interest payments, notwithstanding the
inability of consumers to access their cars, or to use them, if they have
become unusable or dangerous to human health. Where cars remain
44. An example of characteristic language in a security interest contract reads:
In the event of a default in failure to pay by the DEBTOR to the
CREDITOR the amounts due and owing to the CREDITOR pursuant
to an agreement evidencing any obligations to the CREDITOR, the
CREDITOR shall declare the obligations immediately due and payable.
The CREDITOR shall have all remedies according to a secured party
under the Uniform Commercial Code of Illinois.
LawChek, Sample Contract Legal Forms: Security Agreement, http://www.lawchek.net/
Library1/books/contract/sample/security.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2010).
45. A representative eviction clause from an apartment lease agreement reads:
Any failures by the Tenant to pay rent or other charges promptly when
due shall constitute a default herein under and permit Landlord at its
option to terminate this tenancy upon 14 days' written notice to Tenant.
Failure to comply with any other material term or condition herein shall
also constitute a default and permit Landlord at its option to terminate
this tenancy upon 30 days' written notice to Tenant. Upon such
termination(s), all leasehold rights of Tenant under this agreement shall
be forfeited and Tenant shall surrender possession.
Champlain Valley Office of Economic Opportunity, Sample Lease Agreement-Vermont
Tennants, http://www.cvoeo.org/htm/Housing/tenants/Lease agreement.html (last visited
Dec. 2, 2010).
46. See Schwegmann Family Trust No. 2 v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., Nos. 06-2447, 062530, 2007 WL 60971, at *6 (E.D. La. Jan. 5, 2007) (requiring lessee to continue rent
payments as per contractual agreement despite uninhabitability of land in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina); John A. Lovett, Property and Radically Changed Circumstances, 74
TENN. L. REV. 463, 501-507 (2007) (describing default rules governing relationship between
landlords and tenants in Mississippi in event of drastic change of circumstances and
observing that, although tenants may withhold payments of rent in event their building
disappears, tenants do not have right to stay in possession of landlord's property and
withhold rent in order to force landlord to make necessary repairs to the property).
Nonpayment of rent is grounds for a money judgment against a tenant and, in the absence
of equitable relief, forfeiture of the lease. See Colleen K. Sanson, Cause of Action by
ResidentialLandlordto Evict Tenants or Other Occupants, 44 CAUSES OF ACrION 2d 447 §
5 (2010) (stating that failure to pay rent is a common ground for eviction under most state
statutes). But see William K. Jones, Pivate Revision of Public Standards.: Exculpatory
Agreements in Leases, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 717, 738-49 (1988) (describing trend toward
prohibiting broad exculpatory clauses in leases which strip residential tenants of rights or
absolve landlords of their own negligence, and presenting economic analysis opposing
enforceability).
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usable and accessible, self-help language in automobile security
agreements will be invoked to permit repossession. 7
Utility and telecommunications companies will likely charge for, and
demand, the minimum monthly charges for utility service, regardless of
whether premises are unoccupied or actual utilization of services is
possible.' Electricity, gas, water, telephone, cable, and wireless vendors
can continue to assess interest on outstanding balances as of the date of the
catastrophe, and such interest charges will mount quickly.49 Interest
charges, too, will be due and payable despite the impossibility of access to
the services or consumers' inability to make effective use of the time-value
of the money borrowed.so
Where consumers are in danger of becoming delinquent on their
debts, creditors will exploit their power to diminish their customers'
reputations, so as to discourage default. Credit scores are statistical
evaluations of a person's creditworthiness, based primarily upon credit
reports compiled through credit bureaus." Lenders rely on credit scores to
determine whether a potential applicant qualifies for a loan, what interest
rate she will receive, the level of income and asset verification necessary
for approval, and what credit limit shall be imposed.5 2 Given the
47. A characteristic auto security agreement default clause may read:
If Borrower defaults in the payment of this Note or in the performance
of any obligation, and the default continues after Payee gives Borrower
notice of the default and the time within which it must be cured, as may
be required by law or written agreement, then Payee may declare the
unpaid principal balance and earned interest on this Note immediately
due. Borrower and each surety, endorser, and guarantor waive all
demands for payment, presentation for payment, notices of intentions to
accelerate maturity, notices of acceleration of maturity, protests, and
notices of protest, to the extent permitted by law.
Robins Air Force Base, Promissory Installment Note, http://www.robins.af.mil/shared/
media/document/AFD-090317-043.pdf (last visited Dec. 2,2010).
48. See Silber, Thriving on Adversity, supra note 5, at 161 (noting that, in months
following Hurricane Katrina, local electricity companies "began reading meters again and
sought to return to its normal billing schedules. . . . [Wihen the company was not able to
read a meter (for example, when a house had been totally destroyed) it nonetheless
endeavored to 'estimate a customer's usage in order to determine the bills' for September
and October.").
49. See id. at 164 (describing how cable companies, like other consumer creditors,
"charged interest [to victims of Hurricane Katrina] on balances that were outstanding at the
time of the storm for the continuous period thereafter; and, as the balances grew, interest
charges were compounded").
50. See id. at 147 (explaining that principal and interest charges were assessed against
inaccessible and uninhabitable properties in aftermath of Katrina).
51. See myFICO, Understanding Credit Scores: Credit Bureaus & FICO Score
Calculation, http://www.myfico.com/crediteducation/creditscores.aspx (last visited Dec. 2,
2010) (explaining the process of calculating credit scores). For more detail on how credit
scores are calculated, see izfra note 59.
52. See id. ("When you apply for credit-whether for a credit card, a car loan, or a
mortgage-lenders want to know what risk they'd take by loaning money to you. FICO@
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considerable incentive consumers have to maintain a favorable credit
rating, creditors will likely threaten to report defaults and delays to credit
reporting agencies, insurance companies, and similar entities." If these
threats are acted upon, the reports can be expected to detrimentally affect
credit and FICO scores, eventually forcing consumers into less desirable
types of lending, at higher rates with inferior terms.5 4 Creditors will likely
gain leverage by this sort of threat, even where consumers must make
payments for services for which they receive zero use value.
There is another side to this story. Some creditors will try to help
debtors out of empathy, self-interest, or a combination of motivations."
Some creditors will defer, and even forgive, consumer indebtedness in
solidarity with their communities. In other cases, creditors will have little
choice except to write-off or discharge consumer debts because the debtors
are missing, insolvent, or destitute. But all creditors who modify or forgive
claims will interpret their actions as discretionary, since they will not have
been mandated to do so according to the terms of their agreements.
Under the existing contract law, acts of debt forgiveness are normally
acts of generosity rather than obligation. Opting for generosity may not
even be a viable legal decision, since a management executive or board of
directors of a public corporation that forgives debt could violate the
fiduciary duties that executives owe to shareholders or corporate parents.5 6
In sum, the terms establishing payment obligations in standard form
consumer finance agreements offer little protection to consumers. To the
contrary, traditional contract law sanctions the imposition of liability and
confines excuse doctrines even where catastrophe intervenes, leaving
creditors with formidable tools to force repayment and facilitate collection.
A highly oversimplified calculation based on just three sorts of
consumer finance assessments -credit cards, utility bills, and auto loan
scores are the credit scores most lenders use to determine your credit risk.").
53. See, e.g., Illinois Pro Bono, Fair Credit Reporting: Creditor Threats to Ruin Credit
http://www.illinoisprobono.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.dsp
Rating,
Content&contentlD=302#THREATS (last visited Dec. 2, 2010) ("A common creditor and
collection agency threat is to ruin the consumer's credit record if s/he does not pay up on
the debt.").
54. Silber, Thriving on Adversity, supra note 5, at 176 ("[A]s consumers were further
scarred by bad credit ratings connected to late payments and defaults, it was inevitable that
many more consumers would turn to alternative financial markets, markets where the
contract terms were even harsher and rates more expensive.").
55. For example, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, "the Army and Air Force
Exchange Service, an organization that provides goods and services of necessity and
convenience to members of the armed forces, . . . announced its intention to waive interest
andsuspend monthly payment requirements" for displaced cardholders. Id at 170-71.
56. See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj, Fund Investors Sue Countrywide Over Loan Modifications,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2008, at B8 (discussing lawsuit filed by investors against Bank of
America for its proposed plan to modify mortgage loans where mortgagors alleged they
were victims of predatory lending).
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payments -offers some indication of the magnitude of losses automatically
transferred to consumers through standard payment terms. Consider a
case in which five hundred thousand households are driven from their
homes for six months due directly to a catastrophe. Suppose (1) the
average monthly utility charges plus the interest accumulated on previous
balances is $100 per month over those six months." Suppose (2) that the
average interest charges attributable to postponed payments of consumer
credit card balances outstanding at the time of the catastrophe is seventy
dollars per month over those six months. And suppose (3) that the
average interest charges on postponed payments of principal for
automobile loans averages thirty dollars per month above the usual
interest charges.
For a conservative estimate of costs, do not count credit card late fees,
over-the-limit fees, and rental property arrears charges," or higher rates
due to FICO delinquency downgrades," or any of scores of other typical
consumer charges. Exclude, too, any continuing assessment of fees beyond
57. This example sets aside, for the purpose of illustration, the compounding interest
charges that would accrue on the balances of these bills until they are paid.
58. During normal periods, the number of late fee assessments and the dollar cost to
consumers of each assessment has steadily increased on a per-capita basis. See TAMARA
DRAUT & JAVIER SILVA, DEMOS, BORROWING TO MAKE ENDS MEET: THE GROWTH OF
CREDIT CARD DEBT IN THE '90s 35 (2003) (explaining proliferation of credit card penalty
fees and increasing amounts of revenue generated by those fees); U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CREDIT CARDS: INCREASED COMPLEXITY IN RATES AND FEES
HEIGHTENS NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES TO CONSUMERS 5 (2006) (indicating
that the average late fee per assessment has almost tripled from thirteen to thirty-four
dollars in between 1995 and 2005). See generallyNorman I. Silber, Late Charges,Regular
Billing, andReasonable Consumers:A RationaleforA Late PaymentAct, 83 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 855, 855-60 (2008) [hereinafter Silber, Late Charges,RegularBilling,andReasonable
Consumers] (outlining "late fee problem" consumers confront). While it is safe to assume
that credit card late fees, over-the-limit fees, and rent arrears penalties would only increase
during emergency periods, there is no data available on this point.
59. Numerous credit scoring methodologies exist, but the FICO score is widely used
for many purposes, including residential mortgage lending. As described previously:
While the exact formula is a closely guarded secret, it has been disclosed
that the score is approximately determined through a weighted
contribution of 35% past payment punctuality, 30% debt to credit ratio,
15% length of credit history, 10% type of credit that has been utilized in
the past, and 10% recent searches for credit and recent credit obtained.
Silber, Thriving on Adversity, supra note 5, at 176-77 n.128. Late payments, including
"minor late payments . .. such as 30-day delinquencies," can negatively affect consumers'
myFICO, Why Scores Go Down, http://myfico.custhelp.com/cgiFICO scores.
bin/myfico.cfg/php/enduser/std adp.php?p-faqid=3 (last visited Dec. 2, 2010). See also
myFICO, What are the Different Categories of Late Payments and How Does Your FICO

Score Consider Late Payments?, http://www.myfico.com/crediteducation/questions/LateCredit-Payments.aspx (last visited Aug. 13, 2010) ("Your FICO@ score considers late

payment using these general criteria; how recent the late payments are, how severe the late
payments are, and how frequently the late payments occur. So this means that a recent late
payment, could be more damaging to your FICO score than a number of late payments that
happened a long time ago.").
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the six-month period.
Even with the exclusion of these additional costs, more than $600
million ($200 x six months x 500,000 persons) would be charged to the
consumers in question, assessed against them for unusable services and for
interest charges attributable to payment delays and unanticipated
circumstances that the catastrophe brought about.
In the absence of a new model for addressing the problem, consumer
debtors are likely to continue to suffer financial damage of great
magnitude from payment terms that are enforced in the aftermath of
disasters.'

IV.
LOOKING FORWARD: ANTICIPATING FUTURE CATASTROPHES

How should we adjust the laws related to consumer credit agreements
to improve the treatment of consumers in times of catastrophe? One
response might be that they should not be changed at all. Rather, courts
and legislatures should resist the impulse to create exceptions for
catastrophic events and instead should continue to treat them as
extensions of normal occurrences. Such a response assumes that it is
appropriate to rely on market forces to adapt to newly-perceived
catastrophic risks. A second approach might be to adopt government
relief programs that ameliorate injuries after they have occurred. Both of
these approaches are considered below.
A. Market Solutions

Libertarian theorists and classical economists might argue that market
responses are sufficient to help consumers cope with the financial fallout of
disasters. They would argue that, in light of greater publicity being given to
the vulnerability of the public to future disasters, consumers are gradually
becoming attuned to the financial dangers they would face as individuals in
60. Some may argue that consumers in financial distress can resort to bankruptcy to
mitigate their losses. Filing a bankruptcy petition to liquidate or reorganize is an optionor an unavoidable consequence-for consumers facing acute financial distress. In a
consumer bankruptcy liquidation that occurs as a result of a catastrophe, the unsecured
claims of creditors, including interest charges and fees, are paid pro rata from out of the
debtor's estate. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2006) (describing how assets are distributed following
liquidation of debtor's estate). The amount of the claims that remain unsatisfied after
available funds are exhausted is discharged so far as possible. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2006). To
the extent of the discharge, the law permits the debtor to "reallocate" the loss occasioned
by the bankruptcy. Since bankruptcies happen in only a fraction of debt collection cases,
and the remedy is costly and exceptionally traumatic, the "reallocational" result of
bankruptcy cannot be considered a substitute for a general policy of catastrophic loss
redistribution. See generallyElizabeth Warren & Amelia Warren Tyagi, THE Two INCOME
TRAP: WHY MIDDLE CLASS PARENTS ARE GOING BROKE (2004) (documenting hardships of
financial distress and bankruptcy).
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the wake of a disaster. In time, awareness of the problem could lead to
widespread consumer interest in entering only into debt instruments that
limit exposure to catastrophic risk.61 Progressive landlords, utility
companies, and credit card issuers might find ways to gain market share by
offering premium-priced but reasonable credit insurance options that
cover interest accumulations during periods of catastrophe. These sorts of
market-based solutions, however expensive, could theoretically diminish
the need for any sort of regulatory response.
Creditors will have considerable practical difficulty in mitigating their
financial vulnerability to future disasters. At the outset, in order to
mitigate their risk exposure and to spread their losses, they will need to
protect themselves through specialty insurance or reinsurance.6 2
Unfortunately, this sort of all-risk catastrophe protection is either
unavailable or prohibitively expensive. According to the International
Credit Insurance & Surety Association (ICISA), the leading global
association representing trade credit insurers and sureties, only debts
arising from undisputed transactions having a direct link with the
underlying trade transaction- i.e. the delivery of goods and services-are

currently insurable. 63 This means that unless a reinsurance market
develops more fully, creditors attempting to innovate by offering a credit
insurance product covering every catastrophe would be forced to selfinsure, which would limit the scale of an offering.'
While losses arising from a natural disaster are in some cases insurable
61. As indicated earlier, some credit card vendors and mortgage instruments offer
protection to households against the death or unemployment of the primary breadwinner.
See supranote 16 and accompanying text.
62. Insurance and reinsurance companies protect themselves by taking out insurance
policies of their own. See, e.g., Guy Carpenter & Company, LLC, About Guy Carpenter:
Intermediary,
Full-Service
Reinsurance
A
http://www.guycarp.com/portallextranet/about/aboutgc.html?vid=1 (last visited Dec. 2,
2010).
63. International Credit Insurance & Surety Association, Credit Insurance FAQ,
http://www.icisa.org/templates/mercury.asp?page id=1514 (last visited Dec. 2, 2010).
64. See Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The InstitutionalDynamics Of
Transition Relief 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 417-8 (2010) (attributing absence of catastrophic
coverage to problem of correlated risks in disasters; whereas insurance company can safely
insure against house fires in Iowa and New York, as no single event causes both, "[a] single
hurricane can destroy an enormous swath of housing along the Florida coast or (nearly) the
entire city of New Orleans, and only an extremely large and well-diversified insurer could
bear the risk of insuring a substantial number of houses in a potential hurricane path").
Self-insurance is only a viable option when the creditor can establish a fund that is large
enough to cover either one hundred percent of losses, or less than one hundred percent of
losses with the remainder covered by a third-party insurer. In the absence of a private
market for insurance, self-insurance of this type would necessarily involve huge sums of
capital. For an analysis of the effectiveness of self-insurance in the context of state-owned
property, which might be relevant to large commercial parties considering what actions to
take to mitigate risk of losses, see generally Mark R. Greene & Michael L. Murray, SelfInsuranceof State Owned Property,45 J. RISK & INS. 109 (1978).
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under the category of political risk,65 because there is wide variability
among consumers in terms of the ability to pay interest on fluid credit card
balances in the aftermath of a disaster, the cost of insurance is inordinately
expensive. Devising a comprehensive credit insurance scheme for the
national consumer market would more than likely require large
deductibles and exclude coverage for cardholders located in high-risk
areas.66
Even if a market-driven expansion of credit insurance came to pass,
however, there would be limits to its saturation and demographic reach. If
creditors independently innovate along these lines, they will rationally
discriminate between geographical areas of lesser and greater risk and
raise the price of credit in high-risk areas accordingly. Such policies would
encourage people to move away from areas most likely to experience
catastrophes-a problematic social and economic incentive.67 While
incentives to relocate might make sense with respect to areas highly prone
to particular natural disasters, such as flood zones in barrier islands, they
would be futile and counterproductive in the context of terrorism.
At the same time, a market-oriented approach also countenances
economic discrimination. While the inclusion of interest payment
protection, tenant occupancy protection, and other similar consumer
protections within insurance policies could ameliorate some of the
negative financial consequences of disasters, many of the persons in
greatest need of such protection will be unable to pay the premium
demanded for that protection.' Given the price increases necessary to
expand consumer insurance markets to meet demand, it is unlikely that a

65. See International Credit Insurance & Surety Association, supra note 63 (stating
that credit insurance covers political risk-i.e., "the risk of non-payment following an event
outside the control of the buyer or the seller . .. for example the risk that money cannot be
transferred from one country to another").
66. See generally Michael C. Dennis, The Advantages and Disadvantages of
Purchasing Commercial Credit Insurance, http://www.coveringcredit.comlbusiness
creditarticles/CreditConcepts/art507.shtml (last visited Dec. 2, 2010) (detailing the
difficulties associated with purchasing commercial risk insurance).
67. Although there is little debate in the abstract about consumers having no
"responsibility" for an "Act of God," consumer responsibility for losses in the wake of such
Acts is often contested. For example, the citizens of New Orleans are sometimes criticized
for choosing to live below sea level, while the citizens of San Francisco face blame in some
quarters for choosing to live along a fault line. See, e.g., Anna John, Watching 'Treme',
Remembering
Katrina,
THE
ATLANTIC,
Apr.
13,
2010,
http://www.theatlantic.com/culture/archive/2010/04/watching-treme-rememberingkatrina/38841/ ("Among the awful reactions [to Hurricane Katrina] I've heard or read over
the years: 'That's what they get for choosing to live below sea level."'). This article assumes
that businesses and consumers both choose to operate in an affected community, and that,
for this reason, moral claims for assigning responsibility to debtors as a class is
unwarranted.
68. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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sufficient level of coverage would pervade the community.6 9 In addition, in
comparison to other ways of providing financial protection to consumers,
the transaction costs attached to issuing and claiming against millions of
individual policies would increase the expense of insurance.70
In broader perspective, reliance on a market-oriented approach
inappropriately ignores new theories of human behavior in the context of
contracting.
Traditional rational choice theory presumes that the
impersonal market facilitates bargaining toward an efficient norm
embodied in fair, standard terms, which courts, legislators, and regulators
should be loath to amend or displace. 7 1 From a behavioral point of view,
however, intrinsic cognitive mistakes and processing limitations can lead to
inadequate levels of insurance and a poor contracting norm if marketbased solutions are uncorrected by regulatory action.72 As Christine Jolls
and Cass Sunstein point out, "a central impetus for the large body of
existing law regulating consumer safety is the belief that consumers do not
adequately understand the potential risks of the products they use ...
because they lack factual information, because they suffer from bounded
rationality ... or both."7
Socio-legal theories build on empirical studies to suggest that
contracting is inherently imperfect and that it is reasonable for individual

69. See generally MICHAEL M.

GREENFIELD, CONSUMER LAW:

WHO REPRESENT SELLERS, LENDERS, AND CONSUMERS

A

GUIDE FOR THOSE

§ 10.2.1 (1995) (presenting

overview of factors contributing to exorbitant cost of credit insurance).
70. Adopting the approach suggested in Part V would lead the much smaller number
of commercial creditors to insure, rather than the much larger number of consumers. See
infra PartV.
71. See Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 Wis. L.
REV. 679, 683-84 (arguing that nonreading, nonparticipating buyers should be bound to
contract terms, provided that they are "virtually represented in a manner that satisfies the
same objectives as personal assent").
72. For a description of rational choice theory as applied to contractual decision
making, and an exploration of its deficiencies with respect to subprime mortgage
contracting, see Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime
Mortgage Contracts,94 CORNELL L. REv. 1073, 1107-1118 (2009). As long ago as 1943,
Friedrich Kessler posed the question of enforcement of an adhesive term as "whether the
adherent makes a sufficient claim based on public policy or simple fairness to override the
drafting party's claim based on the value of free [rational] choice to enter the contract as a
whole." Todd Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion, An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L.
REV. 1174, 1238 (1983) (citing Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion -Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract,43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 636 (1943)). Forty years later, in
1983, E. Allen Farnsworth could report that nevertheless, most courts would enforce
contracts of adhesion based on an objective determination that a rational decision to enter
a contract had been made "since the objective theory of contracts imposes no requirement
that a party intend or even understand the legal consequences of his actions, a party is not
entitled to relief merely because he neither read the standard form nor considered the legal
consequence of adhering to it." E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.26 (1982).
73. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD.
199, 207 (2006).
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consumers to disregard or to severely discount catastrophic eventualities
when they consider moving ahead with a bargain.74 Where contracting
involves essentially compulsory acquiescence to standardized legal terms,
consumers rarely make accurate predictions of the costs of contingent
outcomes-even when those outcomes are possible or even likely to
occur." Unless large-scale disasters occur with sufficient periodicity to
74. See Subha Narasimhan, Of Expectations,Incomplete Contracting,and the Bargain
Principle,74 CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1129 (1986) ("The premise underlying current contract
enforcement doctrines-that parties should and do foresee and allocate all possible risksis false."). Professor Subha Narasimhan develops a compelling alternative theory of
incomplete contracting that seeks to distinguish between the risks and prices that are
consented to at the time of contract formation and outside risks that should be treated as
subject to allocation under principles of fairness and efficiency. Id at 1127 ("[C]urrent
theory starts from a model of the contracting process in which parties have allocated all
events by the terms of the contract. Doctrines of excuse and modification seek to develop
principled ways of determining which risk-events will serve as grounds for excuse, and
which risk-events may be reallocated by mutual consent. For any risk-event to qualify for
relief it must be unforeseeable, and hence unallocated. As a result, current contract
doctrine is inconsistent in its approach to incomplete contracting, and incompatible with the
goals of the bargain principle.").
The conventional rule does not allow courts to intervene unless one party makes the
exceptional claim that a contract term is unconscionable. However, on rare occasions
courts have accepted the position that contract rights change over the course of a long-term
relationship in response to unanticipated events, and have adjusted terms when one party
faces a substantial unforeseen loss that is not its fault. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v.
Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 60-70, 78-79 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that, under
Indiana's doctrines of impracticability and frustration of purpose, seller was entitled to
equitable restitution where, following execution of the contract, seller's non-labor
production costs rose greatly beyond foreseeable limits of risk). See also Wallace Lightsey,
A Critique of the Promise Model of Contract,26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 45, 66-69 (1984)
(arguing for a model of contract obligations that includes "continual adjustment of the
relationship to unanticipated circumstances that occur as the future unfolds"). Some
scholars have argued against such adjustment of terms, even where bargaining is
concededly incomplete and estimating risks is difficult, ifboth parties are relatively equal in
bargaining power and operate under comparable circumstances of bounded rationality.
See Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term
Contracts,69 MINN. L. REV. 521, 523-24 (1985) ("If a commercial actor is able to bargain
with uncertainty in mind, I suggest the law ought to consider a such bargain the product of
a cognitive and analytical process for which the actor can be held accountable,
notwithstanding the intervention of specific events that the actor did not predict. The
failure of the law to respect decisions made under these circumstances is unjustifiably
paternalistic towards individual actors and frustrates individual effort that would otherwise
generate greater personal and social welfare."). Under such circumstances, "[i]nability to
foretell the future may induce the actors to adopt a mutually beneficial process for
resolution of any event that disrupts their initial expectations. The model does not,
however, compel the imposition of any duty to adjust once that event has intervened." Id.
at 575.
75. See Bar-Gill, Behavioral Economics, supra note 21, at 754-765 (providing
examples of systematic misperception persisting in some consumer markets); Silber, Late
Charges, Regular Billing, and Reasonable Consumers, supra note 58, at 867 (providing
examples of scholarship suggesting that "inherent information processing limits that affect
all of us, as a notable example, affect our ability to estimate probabilities accurately.
Consumers are further limited in their ability to calculate and maximize their expected
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alert consumers to their likelihood, their potential impact is unlikely to be
salient enough to factor into the bargain, even if a standard form
agreement were to draw out the implications of the demand for
unconditional payment when due in large-point type. According to Alan
White, "individuals' predictions are clearly biased and inaccurate" in this

area. 76
Such socio-legal approaches ultimately argue in favor of limiting the
unfairness caused by imperfect information and incomplete contracting.77
While classical assumptions about rational choice are often used to support
enforcement of adhesive terms, they are inapposite where at the time of
contracting the risks are insufficiently salient or highly improbable. In
these circumstances, an approach based on behavioral law and economics
and socio-legal jurisprudence offers a fuller understanding of consumer
behavior."
utilities; the deficiency exists because consumer choices are affected by external
manipulative factors, including 'framing effects' and 'induced disinclinations to maximize
utility under particular conditions."'); Norman I. Silber, ObservingReasonable Consumers:
Cognitive Psychology, ConsumerBehavior and ConsumerLaw, 2 LOY. CONSUMER L REV.

69, 72 (1990) (arguing that, despite the assumption that "consumers are able to anticipate
the consequences and calculate the potential value of their contracts," "[r]esearch has
shown ... that individuals frequently err even in simple calculations, and sometimes avoid
complicated calculations entirely"). Compare, for example, the visibility to a consumer of
the impact of a flood on their ability to pay a debt with the likely impact of rain on a beach
vacation. See Andrew A. Schwartz, A "StandardClause Analysis" of the Frustration
Doctine and the MaterialAdverse Change Clause,57 UCLA L. REV. 789, 816 n.148 (2010)

(describing press release in which the Barbados Tourism Authority promised that "visitors
to Barbados will receive $100 for every day the weather falls below an average of 78
degrees Fahrenheit and accumulates more than a quarter-inch of rain").
76. Alan White, Behavior and Contract, 27 LAW & INEQ. J. 135, 154 (2009)

[hereinafter White, Behavior and Contract]. See also Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier,
Some Implications of CognitivePsychology for Risk Regulation, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND

ECONOMICs 331 (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000) ("[P]eople will tend to overestimate the
probability of an outcome if an example of the event has recently been called to their
attention or otherwise comes readily to mind . . . .
underestimated if the opposite ... is the case.").

Probabilities will tend to be

77. See Narasimhan, supra note 74, at 1129-1132 (arguing that imperfect information
and incomplete contracting are endemic to contracting process and that contract law must
be reformulated to make incomplete contracting the fundamental premise of the contract
process); Edith Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for Using "Knowing
Assent" as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in StandardForm Contracts,

31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 469-473 (2008) (acknowledging that most consumers neither
read standard-form contracts, nor recognize that they have legal challenge to enforcement
of contract terms, nor have means to litigate such claims, and arguing that courts should
abandon unconscionability doctrine in favor of assent-based analysis of unbargained-for
terms); White, Behavior and Contract, supra note 76, at 154 (arguing that consumer
contract law should incorporate the findings of behavioral economists and "prevent seller
exploitation, exploitation which often consists of sellers understanding and using
knowledge about consumer behavior and bounded rationality.").

78. See generally Melvin Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of

Contract,47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995) (canvassing empirical research on human cognition
and arguing that "an understanding of the psychological constraints on decisionmaking
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Behavioral economics and socio-legal theories thus undermine our
faith in using formal understandings of consent and efficiency to justify
enforcement of boilerplate terms that allocate distant risks. They
encourage us to consider common law and regulatory approaches that
would impose alternate terms.79
B. Government ReliefPrograms

Another possibility for addressing consumer debt would be to rely on
an approach that has worked to alleviate some of the worst suffering in the
past: direct subsidies in the form of government disaster relief checks.
Consumers are likely to use a significant part of such relief payments to
pay their consumer installment debts. Proponents of government disaster
relief programs argue that, if properly administered, direct government
assistance to affected populations during times of emergency can
adequately address consumer financial distress.so
Unfortunately, history does not support this claim. To the contrary,
studies of the post-Katrina relief effort reveal that the delivery of
monetary payments to victims in the wake of Katrina, principally by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), was a monumental
failure-a "second" disaster, in the opinion of many citizens."' Financial
should play a central role in the development of contract doctrine"); Martha C. Nussbaum,
The Future Of Law And Economics: Looking Forward: Flawed Foundations: The
PhilosophicalCritique of (a ParticularType of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197 (1997)
(critiquing theoretical underpinnings of "law and economics" movement, and
disaggregating normative and descriptive uses of term "rational"); Cass R. Sunstein,
Empirical Legal Realism: A New Social Scientific Assessment of Law and Human
Behavior: What's Available? Social Influences and Behavioral Economics, 97 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1295 (2003) (arguing that understanding of relationship between behavior and law
requires in-depth examination of social influences that shape and determine behavior).
79. Cf Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the
Waning of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1232 (2006) (suggesting that aggregate
preferences indicate consumers' willingness to buy product at particular price, but do not
represent voluntary interaction or expression of free will); Rakoff, supra note 72, at 1176
(using behavioral economics as frame, proposing that contracts of adhesion be considered
presumptively unenforceable). But see Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal
Standardizationin the Law of Contract,58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1404 (2009) (arguing standard
form contracts should be enforced because contract term standardization reduces
information costs of consent, and that courts should minimize cost sum of contractual
consent).
80. The federal government has made efforts to study this proposition at least in
connection with the cost of insuring housing and replacing damaged property. See, e.g.,
U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NATURAL DISASTERS: PUBLIC POLICY OPTIONS FOR
CHANGING THE FEDERAL ROLE IN NATURAL CATASTROPHE INSURANCE (2007) (examining
seven public policy options for changing federal government's role in provision of
catastrophe related insurance). From a theoretical standpoint, such government assistance
is arguably one of the core functions of government. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE
OF GOVERNMENT 8 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1980) (1690) (stating
civil society was created for purpose of protecting property).
81. Silber, Thriving on Adversity, supra note 5, at 172-76 (arguing that FEMA's
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relief was neither effectively calibrated to the magnitude of individual
consumer debt, nor to the time over which consumers struggled to
These pitfalls inhere in the
normalize their financial condition.'
government assistance model, since relief payments are not self-executing,
immediate, or comprehensive.
A government relief system, furthermore, allows creditors to continue
piling charges onto consumers for their pre-disaster debts during a disaster.
It also allows creditors to make themselves whole for their additional
charges at the expense of consumers, who of necessity use their relief
checks and other resources to pay them off. When a hurricane victim uses
a taxpayer-funded relief check to pay a credit card interest charge that
covers the cost of prior borrowing during an emergency, the government
essentially has used public funds to fully compensate the creditor for a
previous extension of credit over a period of time that has subsequently
proven to include a disaster.
Justice arguably warrants a burden-sharing regime instead. The
possibility for victims to renegotiate or refinance credit terms during a
disaster is irregular or nonexistent. The result is to leave taxpayers and/or
debtors to carry the unanticipated burden of the cost of credit over the
disaster period.83 Taxpayers as a class are not better equipped to bear the
costs of the additional interest charges occasioned by disasters than
debtors or creditors, and creditors are in the best position to adjust the
price of their lending to the risk of nonpayment so that the cost is shared
between themselves and borrowers. There is thus a case for redistributing
the responsibility for the time value of money' among debtors and
consumer relief efforts in response to Hurricane Katrina were woefully inadequate). See
also Spencer S. Hsu, Housing Aid CalledToo Much, Too Little:FEMA Critics Cite Waste
as Evacuees Strain to Pay Rent, WASH. PoST, Oct. 12, 2005, at A6 (detailing FEMA's
inability to adequately provide for housing expenses of resettled Hurricane Katrina
victims); Spencer S. Hsu, OrderShows FEMA Aid Shortcomings:Fraction of Households
to Reach Cap-BureaucracyIs Faulted,WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2006, at A16 (stating that

thousands of families who were denied FEMA aid).
82. See, e.g., Eric Lipton, Leaders in CongressAgree on Aid for GulfRecovery, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2005, at A29 ("Because there is a $26,200 cap on federal disaster aid to
families, many people faced the possibility of taking out a second mortgage to rebuild their
homes or perhaps even filing for bankruptcy.").
83. The same cannot be said of direct payments of principal, which are intended to
ameliorate the suffering of the debtor. See David W. Sar, Helping Hands: Aid for Natural
Disaster Homeless vs. Aid for "OrdinaryHomeless," 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 129, 131
(1995) (observing that stated purpose for government relief in times of natural disaster is to
place victims "back in a position close to that which they were in before the disaster" by
providing essential needs assistance such as housing repair, personal property loss,
transportation, medical expenses, and funeral costs).
84. References to the "time value of money" embody the observation that money
increases or decreases in value over time based on its ability to earn interest. Money today
is thus "worth" more than the same amount of money tomorrow. Credit agreements
account for the time value of money by providing borrowers with the use of money in
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creditors.
Ultimately, neither market forces nor government relief can solve the
problem of consumer debt following a disaster. New solutions must be
developed to protect consumers against the financial consequences of
catastrophe.
V.
PROTECTING CONSUMERS THROUGH SUBSTANTIVE REGULATION: A
MANDATORY FORCEMAJEURE PROVISION

Recognizing the inadequacy of market-oriented solutions and the
inappropriateness of government relief programs for our purposes suggests
a third path-one that builds upon historical efforts to forestall widespread
consumer loss through substantive consumer protection. This path invokes
classic consumer protection approaches, including regulation of standard
form contracts to remedy relational imbalances-of bargaining power,
experience, and sophistication- between lenders and consumers at the
contract formation stage. An administrative or legislative mandate to
include force majeureprovisions in consumer debt agreements could serve
a constructive purpose.
The Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) Holder-In-Due-Course
Rule' provides a model for that agency or the new Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection (BCFP)" to address the relational imbalance between
borrowers and lenders with respect to the loss allocation when
The holder-in-due-course doctrine, which is
catastrophes occur.
embodied in the Uniform Commercial Code, protects assignees of
consumer debt agreements from, inter alia, ordinary contract defenses." It
was entrenched in standard form consumer contracts, to the detriment of
many consumers, until the FTC enacted its own Holder Rule.89 The Rule,
formally enacted as a rule designed for the "Preservation of Consumers'
Claims and Defenses," requires sellers or related entities who lend to
exchange for the payment of interest. The time value of money borrowed by credit card
holders who pay their bills in full and on time is very small. Adam Levitin, The Antitrust
Super Bowl: America's Payment Systems, No-Surcharge Rules, and the lidden Costs of
Credit,3 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 265, 301 (2005). By contrast, disasters disrupt debtors' ability
to repay and create additional interest charges for the use of funds during disruptions,
which neither taxpayers, creditors, nor debtors should desire to absorb.
85. 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1-433.3 (2009).
86. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111203, §§ 1001-1109, 124 Stat 1376, 1954-2129 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of
the U.S.C.) (creating the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection and defining its
powers), availableat
http://www.financialreformwatch.com/uploads/file/Dodd-Frank-Final-Enrolled(1).pdf.
87. See supra Parts II & III.
88. U.C.C. §§ 3-305-3-306 (2001).
89. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (2009).
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consumers to finance their purchases to include a special provision in their
sales contracts and loan agreements.90 This provision preserves the
consumers' defenses to payment under the contract if the seller assigns (or
sells) the financing contract to another creditor, such as a bank or a finance
company.9 1
The Holder Rule does not, by itself, create a right for the consumer to
withhold payment from the entity that purchased the contract. Instead, it
guarantees private rights under state law by preserving any rights given the
consumer under the law, no matter who holds the contract.' As applied to
consumer agreements, the holder-in-due-course doctrine has now been
effectively supplanted by the FTC Rule, without major disruptive effect.93
It is widely accepted, respected, and influential in shaping related areas of
commercial law.94
In similar fashion, the BCFP or FTC could insist upon the insertion of
a force majeure provision in all consumer contract agreements-including
consumer installment contracts, consumer credit agreements, and property
leasing and sale agreements-through administrative action. As Jennifer
Bund has explained, force majeure clauses define "the nature and degree
of extraordinary circumstances that are both necessary and sufficient for
debt forgiveness." The doctrine of force majeure is thus one aspect of the
90. See id. (defining failure to include language describing holder-in-due-course rule as
"an unfair or deceptive act or practice").
91. Id. ("ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS
SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD
ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED
PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF").
92. Id.
93. See U.C.C. § 3-305(e) (2001) (subordinating the holder-in-due-course doctrine to
consumer protection rules).
94. See Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Codificationand the Victory of Form
over Intent in Negotiable Instrument Law, 35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 363, 429-30 (2002)
("Instead of the predicted dire consequences, it appears that the suppliers of consumer
goods and credit, at least the honest ones, have accommodated themselves easily. .. . [T]he
FTC's rule 'has caused some adjustments in the market, largely unseen, but it surely has not
had the catastrophic impact upon consumer market that some predicted.' . . . '[T]he

financial community has not been particularly perturbed by the FTC Rule.'. . .'); Martin B.
White, Coping with Violations of the Federal Trade Commission's Holderin Due Course
Rule, 66 TEMP. L..REV. 661, 661 (1993) ("The substantial abolition of holder in due course
("HDC") status and similar legal devices in consumer transactions has been one of the
major accomplishments of consumer law reformers since World War II.")
95. Jennifer M. Bund, Force Majeure Clauses: Drafting Advice for the CISG
Practitioner,17 J.L. & COM. 381, 383 (1998). Courts apply Article 79 of the United Nations
Convention for the International Sale of Goods, which embodies the force majeure
concept, to determine whether a party's obligation to perform should be excused when
extraordinary circumstances arise. Id. at 386. Article 79 requires the non-performing party
to establish: (1) an impediment; (2) beyond the party's control; (3) that could not
reasonably have been taken into account, avoided or overcome. Id.In addition, to qualify
for Article 79 exemption, the non-performing party must also (4) notify the other party of
"the impediment and its effect on his ability to perform" within a reasonable time. Id,
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doctrine of excuse; conventional contract law considers the employment of
a force majeure provision an appropriate method to define extraordinary
circumstances that will excuse performance.96 The language of a force
majeure provision would extinguish any obligation of a consumer-debtor
to pay interest charges and unearned service fees, and permit the
postponement of debt payment obligations during one of the
circumstances stated in the provision.'
If the FTC were to mandate such a rule, then a creditor's failure to
include a force majeure provision in a standard form agreement would
constitute a punishable "unfair or deceptive act or practice" under the
terms of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act." The BCFP can
invoke similar sanctions.' It would defeat the purposes of the provision to
Once invoked, the Article 79 excuse remains in effect throughout "the period during which
the impediment exists." Id at 387. Under more general UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial contracts, a demonstration of "hardship" can establish an
obligation to renegotiate if it can be shown that a change in circumstances is fundamental
and will cause the party to suffer hardship in the absence of renegotiation. Id.at 390-91.
96. The law of excuse generally assumes that certain events, such as acts of God or
governmental prohibition of performance, are unforeseen at the time of contracting. See
Saul Litvinoff, Force Majeure,Failureof Cause and Theorie De L 'imprevision:Louisiana
Law And Beyond, 46 LA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1985) ("After a contract is made, a party bound
under that contract run into obstacles that make his performance impossible. When such is
the case, that party is not liable for any damages that may result from his failure to perform.
That is the doctrine of force majeure .... ). Therefore, the occurrence of such events will
sometimes be grounds for excusing performance of a contractual obligation. Shirley R.
Brener, Outgrowing Impossibility: Examining the Impossibilty Doctrine in the Wake of
HurricaneKatrina,56 EMORY L.J. 461, 467 (2006) (noting that, under modern impossibility
doctrine, "courts focus on whether the difficulty of performance was contemplated by the
parties during the negotiation of the contract. When the promissee appears to be the bearer
of the risk, courts read the contract to include an implied condition the occurrence of which
excuses the promisor's performance. In contrast, when the promisor appears to have borne
the risk of the unexpected event, his performance is not excused.").
97. For example, the FTC might mandate the inclusion of this provision:
Consumer obligors and guarantors on this instrument shall not be liable
for failure or delay in payment or performance under this Agreement to
the extent the failures or delays are proximately caused by war, riot, civil
disorder, terrorist events or other hostilities; or are proximately caused by
catastrophic weather conditions or other catastrophic circumstances
beyond the control of the obligors and guarantors.
Dates by which payment and performance obligations are scheduled to
be met will be extended for a period of time equal to the time lost due to
any delay so caused or for a longer time by mutual agreement. The
consumer obligors and guarantors reserve all claims and defenses to
payment and performance and to payment of penalties, recurring fees,
interest and other charges and assessments and all claims based on
excuse, impossibility, or the failure of consideration.
Alternatively, Congress could amend the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1601 (2006), to require a similar force majeure term to be included in all consumer credit
agreements.
98. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-58 (2006).
99. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.

2010]

DEBTS, DISASTERS, AND DELINOUENCIES

789

allow a creditor to offer a lower price of credit to a consumer who allowed
the creditor to omit a force majeure provision."o
The regulatory requirement to include a force majeure provision
would not create new federal law or impair any contract right. Like the
FTC's Holder Rule, it would create private rights under state law and
prevent creditors from inserting oppressive language in adhesive
boilerplate.
As indicated earlier, creditors already insulate themselves against
uncertainty through business interruption insurance and other devices
when commercial losses are at stake, but they have generally relied on
contractual loss allocation to deal with the consumer market. 0 1 To the
extent that it shifts the risk of lost charges and fees to creditors, a
mandated clause would reverse incentives to obtain insurance and/or to
self-insure.
Disasters impose unavoidable costs on communities, and law has a
role to play in minimizing and equitably distributing the risk of these costs
in the face of market imperfections. Unlike consumers, creditorsparticularly sophisticated financial institutions -are in a strong position to
lay off their risks. With large capital assets and substantial buying power,
creditors are better situated to negotiate and develop a competitive market
for credit insurance. Of course, creditors are also positioned to distribute
the costs of their insurance down to consumers themselves: They can be
111-203, § 1031, 124 Stat 1376, 2005-06 (2010) (authorizing the BCFP to "prescribe rules
applicable to a covered person or service provider identifying as unlawful, unfair, deceptive,
or abusive acts or practices in connection with any transaction with a consumer for a
consumer financial product or service, or the offering of a consumer financial product or
service").
100. A different approach might establish that the waiver of a standard force majeure
clause is "presumptively" unfair, in order to allow consumers who want to assume
catastrophic risks to do so depending upon whether the assumption is individually
negotiated and sufficiently compensated. For example, the European Parliament has
proposed a directive that would create such a list of presumptively unfair terms. Proposal
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights, PARL.
available
at
2545,
2547)
34
(2008),
EUR.
Doc.
(SEC
2544,
The
list
of
http://ec.europa.eulconsumers/rights/docs/Directive-finalEN.pdf.
presumptively unfair terms would include terms "obliging the consumer to fulfil all his
obligations where the trader has failed to fulfil all his obligations." Id. at 41. As these
terms are only presumed to be unfair, the trader may still prove that the particular term is
fair in the context of a particular contract. See id. at 33 (stating that whether contract term
is, in fact, unfair shall be assessed by examining "the nature of the products for which the
contract was concluded," "all the circumstances attending the conclusion" of contract, "all
the other terms of the contract or of another contract on which the former is dependent,"
and "the manner in which the contract was drafted and communicated to the consumer").
In the case of economic harms resulting from catastrophes, however, the insufficient
salience of the risk of disaster and imperfections in the consumer credit insurance market
argue against permitting consumers to negotiate away the force majeure clause. See supra
Part III and Part IV.
101. See supra Part III.
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expected to recover the cost of their own premiums by spreading them to
consumers, to the extent that the competitive conditions of the market
allow, and to shareholders, if they cannot.1o2
If a force majeure clause were mandated, virtually all creditors who
lend to consumers would either need to hedge against a possible. disaster
through insurance or to self-insure. A major advantage of imposing the
clause would be that a much larger-nearly universal-base of consumer
debtors therefore would be protected, indirectly, through commercial
policyholders. Not only would the market in which commercial creditors
purchase coverage be more robust, economically efficient, and competitive
than the consumer credit insurance market, but insurers would be less
likely to experience catastrophes affecting a major portion of their claims
base at the same time. This would diminish problems of "risk correlation"
which are said to have deterred insurers from issuing policies in the past.103
Critics may argue that the imposition of a compulsory risk-sharing
regime could produce undesirable consequences, particularly if the
provision is widely abused by consumers or interpreted too broadly by
courts. If consumers could anticipate having a payment "holiday" every
once in a while, for example, they would be motivated to borrow more
than they could reasonably repay. Conversely, if creditors could anticipate
that consumers would not invoke the force majeure rule even in legitimate
circumstances, the rule would have little impact.
A more forceful objection might be that a mandatory force majeure
provision would introduce into the credit system unmanageable
uncertainty as to whether any particular debt is actually enforceable. By
depriving creditors of predictability, this uncertainty could, in turn, chill
efficient and beneficial contracting activity.
Should any of these problems arise, however, they would not be
difficult to ameliorate.

As in other cases of rule-based interpretation,

102. See Andrew C.W. Lund, Opting Out of Good Faith,37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 393,
419 (2010) (noting that corporations pass on cost of increased premiums for insurance
against liability and litigation costs associated with "due care" violations by their directors
to shareholders).
103. See Masur & Nash, supra note 64, at 418 (noting that lack of sufficient base of
policyholders is one reason "that insurance companies have been reluctant to write policies
insuring against terrorism, natural disasters, or other large-scale calamities"). In general,
"[i]nsurance companies exist (and succeed) because they are able to diversify across a large
portfolio of unconnected contracts that offer unrelated risks." Id. at 417. However, in
catastrophe-prone areas, risks are correlated, and "one isolated event will force the firm to
pay benefits to millions of homeowners simultaneously." Id
104. Countless terms used in commercial statutes are later repeated in standard
consumer contracts and judicially confined within reasonable limits, including open-ended
phrases such as when a creditor "deems itself insecure," U.C.C. § 1-309 (2001); what is "a
reasonable time," U.C.C. § 2-309; what is a "definite time," U.C.C. § 3-104; what
constitutes "ordinary care," U.C.C. § 4-202; the meaning of "strict compliance," U.C.C. §
5-108; and when repossession is "without breach of the peace," U.C.C § 9-609. See Shael
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common law courts should be capable of interpreting these provisions
reasonably. If they do not, Congress could authorize the FTC, BCFP, or
another regulatory body to use its rulemaking authority to establish
guidelines for the invocation of the provision. It would also be possible to
modify the force majeure provision to restrict its application to officially
declared states of emergency; to require the state of emergency declaration
to expressly invoke force majeure-or to rest responsibility for establishing
these periods with the President and with state governors, who may
petition the President to declare them, as the present FEMA statute
provides.' 0 It may be desirable to include state officials in this decisionmaking process, since they are located among the affected population and
therefore might be less susceptible than federal agents to creditor pressure
Alternatively, executive offices or independent regulatory
groups.
agencies could be authorized to establish guidelines for the application of
force majeure circumstances, subject to judicial review.
Similarly, it is unlikely that such a mandatory force majeure provision
would actually chill contracting activity. It is worth recalling that there
were dire warnings from creditors that the FTC's abrogation of the holderin-due-course doctrine might cause disruption and increased prices, yet
few negative consequences were documented after years of exploration.1
By the same token, hypothetical creditor objections to this proposal merit
skepticism.

Herman, Llewellyn the Civilian: Speculations on the Contribution of Continental
Experience to the Uniform Commercial Code, 56 TUL. L. REV. 1125, 1168-69 (1982)
(noting that one of the U.C.C.'s drafters anticipated that courts would define meaning of
terms reasonably using purpose of the Code as a guide).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 5191 (2006). Robert M. Lawless addressed some of the problems
discussed here by proposing temporary moratoria on the imposition of late fees, penalty
fees, and interest, on adverse credit actions, and on adverse credit reporting for a period of
90-120 days after a hurricane. See Robert M. Lawless, Bankruptcy Filing Rates after a
MajorHurricane, 6 NEV. L.J. 7, 19 (2005).
106. See, e.g., William H. Lawrence & John H. Minan, The Effect of Abrogating the
Holder-In-Due-Course Doctrine on the Commercialization of Innovative Consumer
Products, 64 B.U. L. REV. 325, 338-40 (1984) (noting that abrogation of holder-in-duecourse rule can have minimal impact on availability or cost of credit); Ronald J. Mann,
Searchingfor Negotiabilityin Paymentand CreditSystems, 44 UCLA L. REV. 951, 967-68
(1997) (observing that FTC Rule reflects a rejection of benefits of holder-in-due-course
status, a former "cornerstone of negotiability," but that the Rule's other provisions ensure
promissory notes remain negotiable instruments); Siddhartha Venkatesan, Abrogating the
Holder in Due Course Doctrine in Subprime Mortgage Transactions to More Effectively
Police PredatoryLending, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 177, 214-15 (2003) (reporting
that the FTC concluded that "the abrogation of the [holder-in-due-coursel doctrine in favor
of an affirmative rule of recovery was an efficient marketplace solution in the best interests
of the consumer").
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VI.
CONCLUSION

The proposal above emerges from observing how consumer debtors
are treated, and mistreated, in the aftermath of disasters. Creditors rely on
adhesive contract terms incorporated in standard form credit agreements
to exact interest payments and fees even after catastrophe strikes. 10 7 While
creditors ought to be allowed to continue to require consumers who sign
standard form agreements to continue paying interest on their credit card
balance in the period after their house burns down, for example, they
should not to be able to do so if the entire city burns down.
Without a reform like the one proposed in this article, courts will
continue to force consumers to live up to terms of credit products that
inappropriately hold them accountable for weighing immediate benefits
against the prospect of uncertain, unknowable, unpredictable, and
probably uninsurable future events. 0s Requiring a force majeure
provision to be integrated into standard form agreements would produce a
more reasonable bargain.

107. Silber, Thriving on Adversity, supranote 5, at 139-142.
108. See supra text accompanying note 31.

